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The Debt of Developing  Countries. 
Another  Look 
THE purpose of this report is to reexamine the debt of developing coun- 
tries in the light of the second "oil shock." In 1977, when the dollar price 
of OPEC oil was less than $13  a barrel, I undertook such an exercise 
and, on the basis of data through 1975 or 1976, came to optimistic con- 
clusions about the capacity of  nonoil  developing countries to  continue 
to incur debt.1 As  it turned out, the supply of funds available to those 
developing  countries  that  are major borrowers from  banks  remained 
ample at low real interest rates through 1978,  when the OPEC surplus 
disappeared. In fact, the contraction of the OPEC surplus in the years 
immediately following the first OPEC price shock had its counterpart not 
in a reduction of the aggregate current account deficit of nonoil develop- 
ing countries, as I expected in 1977, but in a shift to surplus by the indus- 
trial countries as a group. 
Today, when the average price of OPEC oil is near $35  a barrel, the 
deficits of  nonoil  developing  countries  look  much  larger  in  nominal 
terms. New debt has grown in relation to the assets and capital of banks. 
A larger proportion of  new borrowing is from banks rather than from 
official sources.  Furthermore, interest rates  on  new  bank  loans  have 
risen sharply. It is reasonable to ask, therefore, whether the heavy bor- 
rowers among nonoil developing countries still appear creditworthy. 
To  provide a basis  for  comparison,  I  first review  the  financing of 
deficits of developing countries in 1974-78.  Then the "debt burden" and 
the economic performance of the eight largest borrowers are examined. 
1. Robert Solomon, "A Perspective on  the  Debt  of  Developing Countries," 
BPEA,  2:1977,  pp. 479-501. 
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This is followed  by a brief discussion of the relations among inflation, 
interest rates, and debt. Finally I ask, as in 1977, what could go wrong? 
Recycling  in 1974-78 
By 1978, just before the second large rise in oil prices, the OPEC sur- 
plus on the current account (goods,  services, and private transfers) was 
close to zero. Even Saudi Arabia, which had a current surplus of  $24 
billion in 1974-almost  two-fifths of the aggregate OPEC surplus-was 
near balance in 1978; in fact, when official transfers are included, Saudi 
Arabia had a deficit in 1978. 
The  pattern of  current account  positions  had by  1978  returned to 
the pre-1974  norm:  a $30  billion  surplus for the industrial countries, 
matched more or less by a $38 billion deficit for the nonoil  developing 
nations.2 Although the current deficit of the latter group was about the 
same nominal magnitude as in 1974, it was smaller in real terms and as a 
proportion of their GNP, which had grown in real terms about 5 percent 
a year. 
In the five years from 1974  to  1978  the cumulative current account 
deficit of nonoil  developing  countries came to just over  $180  billion.3 
It turned out to have been financed remarkably smoothly. In fact, these 
countries as a group managed to add $39 billion to their reserves. Thus 
their net capital inflow, including official grants, was about $220 billion. 
A part of the $220 billion supplied to developing countries in 1974-78 
-$65  billion, or 30 percent-did  not add to their debt because it came 
in the form of direct investment or official grants. Another  $37  billion 
was in official concessionary loans, which went to the poorer countries, 
while almost $20 billion was borrowed from official sources on noncon- 
cessionary terms.4 
2.  A number of so-called nonoil developing countries are now net exporters of 
oil-for  example, Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru. In the remainder  of this paper I 
use the terms non-OPEC  and nonoil interchangeably.  The aggregate  data in this and 
the next section include South Africa and several countries in Europe, which I ex- 
clude from non-OPEC less-developed countries (LDCs)  in the tables below. 
3.  Unless otherwise indicated, all data on balance of payments and its financing 
are from International  Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 1981 (hereafter IMF). 
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The  other major source of  financing was  bank lending,  which was 
concentrated in a relatively small number of advanced developing coun- 
tries. Net bank lending to all nonoil  developing countries amounted to 
$90  billion in  1974-78,  comprising 41  percent of  the current account 
deficit and reserve increase of these countries.5  When questions are raised 
about the future recycling process, it is the durability of this source of 
finance that is in doubt, either because  the major borrowers may lose 
creditworthiness from the standpoint of banks or because the banks or 
their regulators fear overexposure-that  is, too high a proportion of their 
assets tied up in this form. 
Impact of the Second Increase in Oil Prices 
The weighted average price of OPEC crude oil increased about 170 
percent from the end of  1978 to early 1981. The OPEC surplus on the 
current account reemerged, reaching $112  billion  in  1980.  The  deficit 
of all nonoil developing countries jumped from less than $38  billion in 
1978  to $82  billion in  1980.  Of the increase of  $45  billion,  some  $24 
billion was attributable to the trade balance in oil. Although  some ele- 
ments in the current account moved toward surplus, the increase in pay- 
ments of interest that came from both the rise in interest rates and the 
growth of debt led to a $22 billion shift to larger deficit in "gross invest- 
ment income" of  nonoil  developing  countries.6 As  Jeffrey Sachs  and 
others have pointed out, when the rate of inflation increases, current ac- 
count deficits tend  to  overstate  the  true debtor position  since  higher 
nominal interest payments, included in the current account, are matched 
by a real reduction in debt, which is not reflected in the current account.7 
One-third of the increase in the current account deficit was financed 
by a near cessation in the accumulation of reserves, from almost $16 bil- 
lion in 1978 to just over $1 billion in 1980. Another $7 billion came from 
an increase in long-term borrowing from official sources. Although pub- 
5. IMF, "International  Capital Markets: Recent Developments and Short-Term 
Prospects,  1981,"  Occasional Paper 7 (IMF, August 1980), p. 74. 
6. IMF, World  Economic Outlook (IMF, June 1981), pp. 122, 129. 
7. Jeffrey D. Sachs, "The Current Account and Macroeconomic Adjustment in 
the 1970s,"  BPEA, 1:1981, pp. 201-68; and IMF, "External  Indebtedness  of Devel- 
oping Countries,"  Occasional Paper 3 (IMF, May 1981), pp. 12-16 and appendix  2. 596  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
licly announced Eurocurrency bank credits decreased slightly, total inter- 
national bank lending to nonoil developing countries rose sharply, from 
$22 billion in 1978 to $38 billion in 1980.8 
Questions for the Future 
Once again, uncertainty exists about the size and duration of the OPEC 
surplus in the years ahead. Many observers believed,  at least until re- 
cently, that the real price of oil was more likely to be maintained this 
time, in contrast to its decline in 1974-78.  Doubts have been expressed 
again about the  capacity  of  the  OPEC  countries  to  increase  imports 
rapidly. On the other hand,  the  so-called  oil  glut  and Saudi Arabia's 
success in forcing down the prices being charged by other oil exporters 
cast doubt on the contention that the real price will be prevented from 
falling. Furthermore, if Iran and Iraq, whose output and exports of oil 
are depressed as the result of their war, should restore normal output and 
Saudi Arabia should reduce its output correspondingly, a larger propor- 
tion of  OPEC revenues would  be  spent and the OPEC  surplus could 
contract substantially. 
A  major change from the time my earlier article was written is the 
sharp increase that occurred in real interest rates on bank loans to devel- 
oping countries. In 1977 the interest rate on three-month deposits in the 
Eurodollar market averaged 6 percent. In mid-1981  it was 17-3/4  per- 
cent. The rate of inflation in the industrial countries, as measured by the 
advance of consumer prices, has risen much less-from  8.4  percent in 
1977 and just under 10 percent in mid-1981.  The rate of interest on all 
outstanding debt was below the current rate but was probably rising fast 
given that a large proportion of bank loans carry floating interest rates 
and that the major borrowers receive only a small part of their capital 
inflow in the form of loans from official sources carrying relatively low, 
fixed interest rates. 
In the growth-cum-debt model set forth in my 1977 article, the debt- 
income ratio converges to a limit if the real (or nominal)  rate of growth 
exceeds the real (or nominal)  rate of interest. That condition is not met 
8.  Morgan Guaranty  Trust Company  of New York, "World  Financial Markets," 
(September 1981),  p.  16; and Bank for International Settlements, "International 
Banking Developments: First Quarter 1981" (July 1981),  table 6, and preceding 
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Table 1. External  Bank  Debt, Selected  Years, 1975-80 
Billions  of dollars,  end of period 
Bank debt 
Country  1975  1978  1979  1980 
Argentina  3.2  6.7  13.1  18.9 
Brazil  14.8  31.7  36.9  43.3 
Chile  0.8  2.7  4.5  6.7 
Mexico  13.5  23.2  30.7  41.0 
Peru  2.3  3.4  3.6  3.9 
Philippines  2.0  4.0  5.4  7.0 
South Korea  3.3  6.9  10.3  14.0 
Thailand  1.2  2.7  3.0  3.2 
Total  41.1  81.3  107.5  138.0 
Addenda 
All non-OPEC  LDCsa  63.0  120.8  155.9  193.5 
Eight countries  as a proportion 
of all non-OPEC  LDCs  0.65  0.67  0.69  0.71 
Brazil  as a proportion 
of all non-OPEC  LDCs  0.23  0.26  0.24  0.22 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, "International  Banking Development: Second Quarter  1981" 
(November 1981), tables 6 and 7, and preceding issues. 
a.  Nonoil developing countries excluding South Africa and countries in Europe. 
at the  interest  rates  prevailing  in  1981,  and  debt  accumulation  could  be 
characterized  as an explosive  process  rather than  a self-limiting  one. 
On  the  assumption  that  interest  rates  will  come  down,  I  turn  to  an 
assessment  of  the  creditworthiness  of  the  major  borrowers  among  devel- 
oping  countries. 
The  Debt  Position  of Major  Borrowers 
As  noted  above,  a significant  proportion  of  the  aggregate  current  ac- 
count  deficit  of  nonoil  developing  countries  is  financed  by  bank  loans. 
Yet  only  a  small  number  of  developing  countries  are  major  borrowers 
from  banks.  As  table  1  shows,  eight  countries  account  for  more  than 
70  percent  of  the  bank  debt  of  all  nonoil  developing  countries.  These 
eight  countries,  often  referred  to as newly  industrialized,  account  for half 
of the GNP  and nearly  half  of the combined  current  account  deficit  of  all 
nonoil  developing  countries.  The  eight  countries  are  responsible  for  a 598  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
substantial proportion of the net oil imports of developing countries. In 
1978, for example, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Philippines, South Korea, 
and Thailand had combined net oil imports of $9.4  billion, which was 
just about half of the net oil bill of all nonoil-exporting developing coun- 
tries. (The  latter group excludes not only members of OPEC but also 
countries such as Egypt, Mexico,  and Peru, which are net exporters of 
oil.) 
Brazil and Mexico  continue to be major debtors of  banks. Because 
Brazil is singled out for more detailed analysis below, it is worth observ- 
ing that it accounts for more than one-fifth of the bank debt of all non- 
OPEC developing countries. 
Although bank debt for the eight countries tends to be a higher pro- 
portion of total debt than for developing countries in general, these eight 
also had a large amount of other forms of debt, much of it at fixed interest 
rates, in contrast to the variable rate paid on most bank debt. 
While these eight countries held  a smaller fraction of  total than of 
bank debt, as would be expected, they still account for more than half 
of the total debt (over one year)  of all non-OPEC developing countries. 
Once again Brazil stands out with  $55  billion,  or  18  percent of  total 
debt in 1980. But it should be stressed that Brazil also accounts for nearly 
one-fifth of the GNP of all non-OPEC developing countries. 
The Burden of Debt 
As  indicated  in  my  1977  article,  the  traditional debt-service  ratio 
(interest plus amortization as a proportion of exports of goods and ser- 
vices)  is a defective measure of debt burden. Table 2 shows the ratio of 
annual interest payments to export of goods and services, although this 
ratio is defective also because it is biased upward by inflation. Even if the 
percentage point increase in nominal interest rates were no greater than 
the acceleration of export prices, the proportionate rise in interest rates 
would be a multiple of the proportionate rise in prices. For example, as- 
sume both the inflation rate and interest rate rose from 5 to 10 percent. 
The price level would be 5 percent higher after a year, but interest rates 
would have doubled. Thus the measure used here exaggerates the increase 
in debt burden in periods when inflation accelerates and interest rates rise 
correspondingly. Robert Solomon  599 
Table 2. Interest  Payments  as a Percent  of Export  Proceeds,  1973-80 
Country  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980a 
Argentina  5.3  7.8  11.0  8.3  7.1  9.6  10.1  13.5 
Brazil  5.5  15.7  20.4  15.0  14.8  21.3  26.1  28.2 
Chile  2.6  4.9  11.7  11.0  10.1  12.1  12.1  15.1 
Mexico  7.1  12.8  17.4  18.9  19.4  18.3  20.5  18.3 
Peru  7.1  10.3  16.0  17.6  16.4  17.9  13.3  12.7b 
Philippines  1.3  3.0  3.8  4.8  5.3  6.3  7.6  6.9 
South Korea  5.5  4.1  5.3  4.5  3.8  4.0  4.8  6.0 
Thailand  1.2  2.5  3.4  3.1  3.0  3.9  4.7  5.4 
All non-OPEC 
LDCs  4.4  3.8  4.8  4.5  4.6  5.5  6.5  7.4 
Sources: World Bank; last row, IMF,  World  Economic Outlook (IMF, June 1981), p. 135. 
a.  Calculated by the author based on World Bank data on interest payments and IMF balance-of-pay- 
ments data from Initernationial Finianicial Statistics, vol. 34 (October 1981), pages on individual countries. 
b. Based on exports of goods and services in first half of 1980. 
Since  1973  all but one of the eight countries experienced significant 
increases in the ratio of annual interest payments to exports of goods and 
services. South Korea's ratio was held down by the phenomenal growth 
of its exports. Peru's position has changed since its debt rescheduling of 
1978 as the result of its oil exports and the improvement in its current 
account. The countries for which the ratio is both high and rising are 
Brazil and, less  clearly, Mexico.  For  the other countries, the share of 
export proceeds that are preempted by interest payments on external debt 
is relatively small. It appears that only two of the eight countries have a 
potential debt burden problem. 
Before looking at Mexico  and Brazil in greater detail, I examine the 
economic performance of the eight countries. 
Economic Performance of Major Borrowers 
As a basis for judging creditworthiness, my 1977 article examined not 
only measures of  debt burden but also indicators of  economic  perfor- 
mance. These indicators are reviewed in this section. 
The rates of growth of real GDP in the eight countries are shown in 
table 3.  Brazil, the Philippines,  South Korea  (except  for  1980),  and 
Thailand have maintained persistently strong rates of growth since 1970. 
Mexico's growth accelerated in  1978-80  to  quite a high  rate.  Chile's 600  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
Table 3.  Rates of Growth of Real Output, 1970-80 
Percent per year 
1970-74, 
Country  average  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 
Argentina  5.2  -0.9  -1.7  4.9  -3.4  8.5  1.1 
Brazil  11.5  5.7  9.0  4.7  6.0  6.4  8.0 
Chile  2.6  -11.3  4.1  8.6  7.8  8.5  6.5 
Mexico  6.2  4.1  2.1  3.3  7.3  8.0  7.4 
Peru  6.3  3.3  3.0  -1.2  -1.8  3.8  3.1 
Philippines  6.7  5.9  6.1  7.0  7.6  6.0  5.4 
South  Korea  9.9  8.1  13.9  10.1  11.3  7.1  -3.4 
Thailand  7.0  7.1  8.7  7.2  10.1  6.1  6.3 
All non-OPEC 
LDCs  6.Oa  4.0  5.4  4.8  5.5  4.9  4.4 
Sources: For the Latin American countries until 1979-United  Nations Commission for Latin America, 
as reported in Finiancial  Times, June 29,  1981, p. I; for  1980 data-Inter-American  Development Bank, 
Econiomic  and  Social  Progress  in  Latin  America:  1980-81  Report,  p.  400;  other  countries,  IMF,  Initer- 
nationial Financial Statistics,  vol.  34 (October  1981), pages on  individual countries; for all  non-OPEC 
LDCs,  IMF,  Anniual Report,  1981,  p.  12. 
a.  For the 1973-74 period. 
economic performance improved markedly after 1976. Peru and Argen- 
tina have grown erratically and, on average, much more slowly than the 
other six countries; both, as noted, have relatively low debt burdens. 
Except for Peru, all eight countries increased exports in 1970  79 much 
faster than the average for all middle-income  developing countries, as 
displayed in table 4. Furthermore, export expansion accelerated in the 
1970s  for most of  the eight countries, in contrast to  the record of  all 
middle-income  developing  countries. As  noted  above,  Korea's exports 
increased at an almost unbelievable rate. 
Considering the sluggish import expansion of the industrial countries 
since  1973-averaging  only  3.3  percent  annually-the  export perfor- 
mance of most of the eight countries is striking. It should be noted that 
Peru's exports began to increase again after 1976.  Moreover, as an oil 
exporter, it  is  making up  in  higher prices  the  shortfall  in  its  export 
volume. 
It should also be pointed out that the figure for export growth of Brazil 
in table 4  is  contradicted by  data from another source. According  to 
statistics of the International Monetary Fund derived from the Getulio 
Vargas Foundation, the volume of Brazil's exports, including coffee, in- 
creased at a compound annual rate of 9.1 percent in 1970-79  (and  10.1 
percent in 1970-80).  Excluding coffee, which comprised 12 percent of Robert Solomon  601 
Table 4. Rate of Increase  of Volume  of Exports,  1960-79 
Percent  per year 
Country  1960-70  1970-79 
Argentina  3.4  10.7 
Brazil  5.1  7. Oa 
Chile  0.6  10.7 
Mexico  2.8  10.9 
Peru  2.0  1.7 
Philippines  2.2  6.2 
South Korea  34.1  25.7 
Thailand  5.2  12.0 
Low-income  nonoil LDCs  5.0  -1.0 
Middle-income  oil-importing  LDCs  6.3  4.4 
Source:  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report,  1981,  pp.  148-49. 
a.  See text for a different estimate. 
the  value  of  exports  in  1980,  the  volume  of  exports  rose  13.4  percent 
annually  in  1970-80.9  On  this  basis,  Brazil's  export  performance  seems 
considerably  more  impressive. 
As  another  measure  of performance,  table  5 presents  the available  data 
on  the  ratio  of  gross  fixed  capital  formation  to  gross  domestic  absorp- 
tion.10 Although  the information  is spotty,  it can  be  seen  that  since  1973 
Chile,  Mexico,  Peru,  the  Philippines,  South  Korea,  and  Thailand  have 
increased  the  share  of  available  resources  used  for  fixed  investment. 
These  countries  are  not  borrowing  merely  to  maintain  consumption  in 
the face  of higher  oil  prices.  Brazil  shows  a small  decrease  after  1976  in 
the  share  of  absorption  devoted  to  capital  formation.  This  was  accom- 
panied  by  a reduction  in  the  current  account  deficit  as  a proportion  of 
GDP. 
A  Closer  Look  at Mexico  and  Brazil 
Even  though  Mexico's  petroleum  exports  amounted  to  about  $10  bil- 
lion  in  1980,  nearly  two-thirds  of  total  merchandise  exports,  market 
9.  IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics,  Yearbook  1981  (IMF,  1981),  p.  125. 
10. The rationale for this formulation of the measure of resources devoted to 
capital formation is  given  in  Solomon,  "A  Perspective on  the  Debt," p.  498. 
Another reason is to eliminate the inflation bias in GNP, which is reduced by in- 
terest payments abroad,  though a part of these payments represents  amortization  of 
debt  under  conditions  of inflation. 602  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
Table 5.  Gross Fixed Capital Formation as a Percentage of Total Absorption, 
Selected Years, 1973-80a 
Country  1973  1976  1978  1979  1980 
Argentina  20.1  22.6  21.6  n.a.  n.a. 
Brazil  22.7  23.1  21.7  21.1  21.4 
Chile  12.9  9.1  14.3  14.8  16.7 
Mexico  20.2  21.4  22.2  24.8  n.a. 
Peru  12.6  15.7  14.5  15.9  17.2 
Philippines  16.0  23.0  22.6  23.4  24.0 
South  Korea  23.1  23.2  29.7  30.2  28.8 
Thailand  20.1  21.2  23.9  24.5  25.0 
Source: IMF, Initernational  Finianicial Statistics, various issues, pages on individual countries. 
n.a. Not available. 
a.  Total absorption is GDP minus exports plus imports of goods and services. 
participants have been disturbed by the scale at which Mexico has found 
it necessary to borrow abroad.1' Furthermore, capital flight and down- 
ward pressure on the exchange rate have been reported. In fact, the dollar 
value of the peso fell  about 8 percent in the first ten months of  1981. 
While this would not be noteworthy in most other Latin American coun- 
tries, Mexico's economic links to the United States make the maintenance 
of a stable exchange rate desirable, even though Mexico's rate of inflation 
exceeds 25 percent a year. 
Mexico's current account deficit increased from $3.3  billion in  1978 
to $7.5 billion in 1980 despite the fact that the country had become a net 
exporter of oil.  As  Sachs has argued, a major reason for the enlarged 
current account deficit was the substantial increase in capital formation 
as a fraction of available resources, as shown in table 5.12 The Mexican 
peso may also have been overvalued in this period. Given the high rate of 
investment, the strong rate of growth, and the availability of oil, it is hard 
to believe that Mexico will not continue to look like a good credit risk. 
As is well known, Brazil's rate of inflation is extremely high. Whatever 
the political and social effects, no one seems to be attributing much, if 
any,  of  Brazil's balance  of  payments  and  debt  problems  to  inflation. 
Monetary correction and the crawling-peg exchange rate are an old story 
in Brazil. 
Several aspects of the external position of the economy deserve atten- 
11. See, for example, The Journal of Commerce, July 2, 1981, p. 23B. 
12. Sachs, "The Current  Account and Macroeconomic Adjustment,"  p. 232. Robert  Solomon  603 
tion if one is trying to assess Brazil's capacity to carry additional debt. 
The current account deficit increased from  $7  billion  to  $12.9  billion 
between 1978 and 1980. The trade deficit, with imports measured c.i.f., 
increased by $2.5 billion. This increase in the trade deficit was consider- 
ably less than the $5.7 billion increment in the landed cost of petroleum 
imports during this period. What is remarkable is that from 1979 to 1980, 
despite a near doubling of the price of oil and an increase in the dollar 
value of oil imports by $3.5 billion, Brazil's trade deficit was unchanged. 
Real GNP grew at a rate of about 8 percent but the volume of imports 
declined 6.5  percent. Export volume, including coffee, increased about 
23 percent. 
Over a longer period it is even more remarkable that the volume of 
Brazil's imports in  1980  was below the level of  1975,  while real GDP 
was up nearly 40 percent. Import substitution appears to be at work, but 
not at the expense of export expansion. Export volume increased about 
63 percent from 1975 to  1980.13  By now more than half of Brazil's ex- 
ports consist of industrial products, including airplanes sold to commuter 
airlines in the United States. Thus the Brazilian economy is demonstrat- 
ing resilience and the ability to supply attractive products in its export 
markets. 
The only fly in the ointment is the interest on external debt. From 1978 
to 1980, when external debt (with maturity over one year) increased by 
$8.5 billion, annual gross interest payments rose $3.5 billion (from $3.1 
billion to $6.6 billion).  This rise in interest was equal to three-fifths of the 
increase in the current account deficit. Gross interest payments as a pro- 
portion of average debt outstanding during the year (estimated by averag- 
ing year-end data)  advanced from about 7.7  percent in  1978  to  12.3 
percent in 1980,  somewhat less than the increase in average Eurodollar 
yields.14  If interest rates had remained at the  1978  level,  gross interest 
payments would have been $2.5 billion lower in 1980. About two-thirds 
of the increment in interest payments from 1978 to 1980 was accounted 
for by the advance in interest rates and one-third by the increase in debt. 
Since 1980, market interest rates have risen considerably further. 
In these circumstances, Brazil has imposed restrictive policies on do- 
13.  All data are from  IMF,  Intertiational  Financial  Statistics,  vol.  34  (December 
1981),  pp. 90-93. 
14. Data on interest payments and debt outstanding are from the World Bank. 604  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
mestic activity and on imports. Imports have fallen and Brazil registered 
a trade surplus in the first ten months of 1981, but at the cost of a reces- 
sion. Industrial production fell in  1981.  Even if the external accounts, 
excluding interest, are brought into balance, interest on the debt already 
outstanding at the end of 1980 at interest rates prevailing in late October 
would require gross interest payments by Brazil of roughly $7-1/2  billion 
a year, larger than the current account deficit in 1978. 
At current  levels of interest rates, the burden of servicing debt is heavy. 
I now turn to this problem and its relation to inflation. 
Inflation, Interest Rates, and Debt 
During much of the  1970s  real interest rates in the industrial coun- 
tries were negative or, if positive, very low.15 This favorable condition, 
from the viewpoint of borrowing countries, changed beginning in 1979. 
Part of the advance in interest rates matched the acceleration of infla- 
tion. Such an increase in nominal interest rates speeds up debt amortiza- 
tion, compensating for the reduction in the real value of debt. As Sachs 
puts it:  "A rise in inflation that is exactly matched by a rise in interest 
rates causes a rise in interest income for a creditor country that is exactly 
offset by greater capital losses."16 
By the same token, the short-term burden of higher interest payments 
on the debtor countries is offset by the reduction in the real value of debt. 
In effect, accelerated amortization occurs. 
When nominal interest rates rise by more than the acceleration of infla- 
tion, as has happened, an uncompensated burden is imposed on borrow- 
ers. The magnitude of the burden is a function of the size and duration of 
the increase in real interest rates. The burden shows up in enlarged cur- 
rent account  deficits, which in  turn require heavy  borrowing and  en- 
gender doubts about creditworthiness. As  Brazil has demonstrated this 
year, debtor countries respond with actions that cut back on their imports 
and their rates of growth. This in turn affects the exports of industrial 
15. Sachs, "The Current  Account and Macroeconomic Adjustment,"  p. 225. 
16. Ibid., p. 206. I am grateful to Ralph C. Bryant,  William Cline, and Jeffrey  D. 
Sachs for helping to straighten me out on the relation between inflation and the 
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countries. Thus if real interest rates do not come down soon, the outlook 
for debt-financed economic  development is  bleak.  But  a drop  in  real 
interest rates brought on by recession in industrial countries would not 
be helpful because the benefit from lower interest payments would  be 
offset by reduced exports by developing countries. 
What Could Go Wrong 
The major borrowers among developing countries weathered the first 
oil shock rather well, justifying the optimism expressed in my 1977 arti- 
cle. One reason for this outcome was that the industrial countries, in the 
aggregate, restored a reasonably satisfactory rate of  expansion  in real 
GNP  after the recession  of  1975.  Although  expansion  in Europe  and 
Canada was rather sluggish, Japan and the United States pulled up the 
average. If the industrial countries do  not  emerge from the stagnation 
evident in 1980-81,  the developing countries will have problems in ex- 
porting and in servicing debt. It is difficult to say anything fresh about 
this or about the dangers of protectionism in the industrial countries. 
Whether the banks will be deterred from continuing to lend because 
they will reach exposure limits is beyond the scope of this paper.17 There 
is little evidence that this will be a serious problem in the medium-term 
future. It is true that U.S. bank claims on developing countries have in- 
creased much faster than bank capital since the second oil shock was felt 
in 1979.18 Just as the current account deficits of the major borrowers de- 
clined in real terms after the first oil shock, they are likely to decline again 
this time, assuming that the industrial countries restore reasonable rates 
of expansion that permit continued growth of LDC exports. In this case, 
the rate of increase of bank loans is likely to fall. 
Finally,  it is possible  to  envision  a much larger role  for  the  Inter- 
national Monetary Fund and a smaller role for the banks, should that 
become necessary, to keep the recycling process going. 
17. For a survey of  bankers' views, see  Group of  Thirty, "The Outlook for 
International  Bank Lending," 1981. 
18. Henry C. Wallich, "LDC Debt-To  Worry or Not To Worry,"  Remarks at 
the 59th Annual Meeting of  the Bankers' Association for  Foreign Trade, Boca 
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Conclusions 
The record of the major bank borrowers among developing countries 
is favorable. Even when debt burden is measured by interest on external 
debt as a proportion of exports of goods and services, which exaggerates 
the burden when interest rates rise with inflation, only Brazil and Mexico 
of the eight countries need to be looked at closely from the viewpoint of 
creditworthiness. Mexico's  oil  and  its  prospects  for  continued  rapid 
growth are strong elements in its creditworthiness. Brazil's export per- 
formance and its  ability to  compress imports provide  a good  deal  of 
assurance about its capacity to prevent its external debt from becoming 
unmanageable even  in the  short run. In the longer run, the Brazilian 
"miracle"  should go on and, with it, a reasonably strong external position 
should continue. In general, therefore, one can conclude  that the eight 
countries are creditworthy. 
It does not follow that lenders, especially bankers, will share this view 
or that other obstacles such as exposure limits will not interfere with the 
recycling process. If the economic growth of developing countries is to 
continue, not only must existing maturities be refinanced but additional 
financing must be made available to cover the inevitable current account 
deficits of the next few years. It is commonly  accepted that the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund will play a larger role, not by "bailing out" the 
banks but by supplementing commercial bank lending and providing a 
"seal of approval." 
If a substantial OPEC surplus persists, it may become necessary for the 
international financial community to consider innovative means of finance 
-means  that will  assure the  siphoning  of  funds  from  OPEC  to  oil- 
importing countries in deficit. Without this, the world economy could slip 
into much worse stagnation than anything witnessed in recent years. For 
now there is comfort to be taken from the economic and financial posi- 
tions, past and present, of  those  non-OPEC  developing  countries that 
have been the heaviest borrowers from commercial banks. 
All this assumes that the exceedingly high real interest rates of  1981 
will come down and stay down. If that assumption does not materialize, 
not only the advanced developing countries but the world economy will 
be in serious trouble. Robert Solomon  607 
Discussion 
JEFFREY SACHS noted that the international lending markets seem to 
regard loans to less-developed  countries as low  in risk. This  could  be 
inferred from the interest rate premiums charged on these loans, which 
have remained extraordinarily low over recent years. John Shoven sug- 
gested several explanations for the low  interest rate premiums. Banks 
might provide economic and military assistance to many of the borrow- 
ing countries, and the borrowers might fear the cessation of  aid in the 
event of default. Or the chance of default might genuinely be very low, 
contrary to naive expectations, because the costs of default to the bor- 
rowing country are quite high. By repudiating its debts, a country would 
be indefinitely prevented from borrowing again. Sachs added that there 
have in fact been only two debt repudiations by LDCs  in the postwar 
period-by  Ghana (which was later converted to a rescheduling)  and by 
North Korea. In both cases, the costs to the defaulting country were sub- 
stantial, since even normal trade flows could not be financed. In addition, 
there are no known cases in which commercial banks rescheduled LDC 
debt at an interest rate below the market rate. Thus to all appearances the 
loans  are reasonably safe.  Donald  Hester  agreed that the  margins on 
international loans have recently been small but pointed out that profit 
margins in large multinational American banks have sharply declined in 
recent years, suggesting that necessary rollovers of LDC debt might be 
unprofitable. 
Ralph Bryant observed that Brazil's impressive success in containing 
its trade balance is partly due to dampening imports through restrictive 
policies  and  encouraging  exports  through  subsidy  arrangements. He 
pointed out that such policies could not be pursued successfully through- 
out the world as a whole, and not even by all developing countries, with- 
out risking slow growth and stagnating trade. Consequently, these policies 
should not be construed as a model for widespread adoption by develop- 
ing countries. 